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11 Introduction
Ever since the seminal work of Hotelling (1929), spatial competition has been extended
in a number of ways within the framework of oligopoly. When ﬁrms compete in location
and price of a homogeneous good, Hotelling (1929) conjectured that they agglomerate at
the market center in order to obtain a larger market area. However, this is proved to
be false by d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), who showed that ﬁrms always
locate apart in order to relax price competition. Otherwise, they are involved in Bertrand
price competition, which pushes their proﬁts down to zero.1 In brief, the main message
in spatial competition is that keen competition always leads to dispersion of ﬁrms over
space.
It is true that some retail ﬁrms such as gas stations and convenience stores tend
to locate apart, but it is also true that they often form clusters. Casual empiricism
suggests that shopping centers and malls are prevalent and have been increasing in size and
number everywhere in recent years. One could think of Broadway or Champs d’Elysees,
where hundreds of shops and restaurants provide a wide array of diﬀerentiated goods and
services.
Such a stylized fact of agglomeration of retail ﬁrms is in sharp contrast to the results
obtained in the above literature on spatial competition. The crucial reason for the contrast
is substitutability of goods. If goods are homogeneous, it is no doubt that ﬁrms avoid
Bertrand price competition in spite of the attractiveness of the market center. However,
i ft h eg o o d ss o l db yﬁrms are heterogenous, such competition would be relaxed. It is
possible that the repulsion due to the ﬁerce price competition may be outweighed by the
attractiveness of the center in the case of heterogeneous goods.
As a matter of fact, agglomeration of retail ﬁrms is shown to be a Nash equilibrium by
1T h es a m ec a nb es a i dw h e nﬁrms compete in diﬀerent strategies. For example, Peng and Tabuchi
(2007) show that ﬁrms never locate back to back when they compete in location and variety.
2introducing heterogeneity of goods in the literature. de Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou,
and Thisse (1985) ﬁrst showed that agglomerated conﬁguration at the market center
is a Nash equilibrium (which is the so-called the principle of minimum diﬀerentiation in
the theory of product diﬀerentiation) when goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated and/or the
transport costs are suﬃciently low. De Fraja and Norman (1993) showed the same result in
the case of duopoly with the linear demand under several pricing schemes. Henkel, Stahl,
and Walz (2000) and Ago (2008) also showed the same result in the case of monopolistic
competition.
Although ﬁrms choose to agglomerate at the market center under suﬃcient diﬀerentia-
tion and/or low transport costs, this is not the only possible equilibrium. In reality, ﬁrms
often locate in the suburbs of large cities due to easy access buy cars for the beneﬁto f
consumers as well as low land rent for ﬁrms. It is therefore more appropriate to consider
t h ec a s et h a ti nl a r g ec i t i e st h e r ea r em u l t i p l em a r k e t p l a c e s ,w h e r em a n yﬁrms enter freely
and sell diﬀerentiated goods and services under a monopolistically competitive market.
Table 1 describes the declining shares of retail employment in the central district,
along with the increasing share in the suburbs during the postwar Tokyo Metropolitan
Area (TMA). Such a tendency is also similarly found in the value of retail sales during the
study period. Two deﬁnitions of the center are taken into account: the smaller center is
CBD1 consisting of four wards located around Tokyo Station, and the larger one is CBD2
comprising twenty-four wards that include CBD1. TMA is composed of the center and
suburbs, which encompasses four prefectures with a population greater than 17 million in
1960 and 34 million in 2007. Table 1 evidently shows how retail employment is growing
much faster in the suburbs than in the center of the TMA during the postwar period.
Based on the foregoing observations, I build on Henkel et al. (2000). Self-organizing
marketplaces across space, ﬁrms compete in price and location in order to attract con-
sumers under a monopolistically competitive market, whey each ﬁrm has a negligible
impact on other ﬁrms in terms of their price and location strategies in the markets. They
3compete not only within the marketplace in which they locate but also between market-
places. The competition within a marketplace is keener as the number of ﬁrms at the same
marketplace increases. However, such an agglomeration is not necessarily undesirable for
ﬁrms because it can attract more consumers relative to other marketplaces.
This paper diﬀers from Henkel et al. (2000) in three respects. First, stability of
equilibrium is deﬁned by dynamics with a mass of ﬁrms rather than by a strong Nash
equilibrium with a discrete number of ﬁrms. This is because each ﬁrm has no strategic im-
pact on others under monopolistic competition, so that the dynamics with a mass of ﬁrms
should be more appropriate than a strong Nash equilibrium in the case of monopolistically
competitive markets.
Second, unlike Henkel et al. (2000), some consumers may not be served consumers
when transport costs are high. This is because the income net of transport costs of
consumers located at a distance from the marketplace may become negative as the ge-
ographical space gets suﬃciently large. In this case, new marketplaces, which are often
called edge cities, would emerge in peripheral areas when cities grow suﬃciently large
in size. It should be noted that in spite of the fact that edge cities are shown to be
prevalent in the real world (Garreau, 1991; McMillen and Smith, 2003), few analytical
models of edge cities and subcenters have been developed in the literatures to the best
of my knowledge. Exceptions are Fujita and Ogawa (1982), Henderson and Mitra (1996);
Fujita, Thisse, and Zenou (1997); and Cavailhes, Gaigne, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2007).
However, they consider two edge cities at the most, where ﬁrms produce rather than sell
goods.
Third, the space is extended from one-dimensional to two-dimensional in order to
meet a more realistic urban structure. Interestingly it is shown that the two-dimensional
extension yields Christaller’s (1933) and Lösch’s (1940) hexagonal systems of marketplaces
as a market outcome. Note that Löschian polygonal systems are investigated by Eaton
and Lipsey (1976). However, ﬁrms produce rather than sell goods in their model.
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the model by Henkel et
al. (2000) brieﬂy. Section 3 characterizes the agglomerated equilibrium and its stability,
and section 4 analyzes the symmetric equilibrium and its stability. Section 5 then studies
an evolutionary process of urban structures and show how edge cities emerge successively.
Section 6 extends it to the two-dimensional space and obtains the hexagonal conﬁguration
of marketplaces. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Consumers are uniformly distributed over space with the density normalized to 1. For a
moment, they are assumed to be distributed on a line segment x ∈ [−L/2,L/2],w h e r eL
is the mass of consumers. They have the same CES utility with respect to a continuum










where q(v,x) is the consumption of variety v at location x and σ > 1 is the elasticity of




p(v)q(v,x)dv + tx, (2)
where t is the unit transport cost for visiting a marketplace and x i st h ed i s t a n c et oa
marketplace. Assume for a moment that
y − tL > 0 (3)
so that visiting any marketplace is possible throughout the line segment.
Each consumer maximizes (1) with respect to q(v,x) subject to the income constraint




0 p(v0)1−σdv0 (y − tx). (4)




(p(v) − c)q(v,x)dx − f. (5)
where X is the set of consumers who purchase a variety from ﬁrm v at a marketplace.
Firm v maximizes its proﬁt (5) with respect to its mill price given demand (4). The






which turns out to be constant for any variety v and for any location. Because each ﬁrm
can be treated symmetrically, we drop v hereafter.






(y − tx)dx − f =0 (6)







(y − tx)dx. (7)







σ−1 (y − tx).
When there are multiple marketplaces, consumers are assumed to visit only one that
yields the highest utility and consume all varieties available at the marketplace.
3 Agglomerated equilibrium
In order to examine stability of equilibrium, one has to deﬁne dynamics of ﬁrm behavior.
When there are m marketplaces at locations x1, x2,..., and xm, I assume the following
dynamics
·
ni = πi (n1,n 2,...,nm), (8)
6w h e r et h ed o td e n o t e st h et i m ed e r i v a t i v ea n dt h es u b s c r i p ti denotes the marketplace
number. Dynamics (8) implies that ﬁrms are more attracted to marketplaces having
higher proﬁts and they do not enter a marketplace if the anticipating proﬁti sn e g a t i v e .
Given the dynamics, the spatial equilibrium is such that
πi ≤ 0 and πini =0 ∀xi ∈ [−L/2,L/2].
T h ed y n a m i c s( 8 )i sstable if any inﬁnitesimal perturbations in the distribution of ﬁrms
result in a movement back toward the equilibrium. This can be checked by computing
the eigenvalues of Jacobian of the RHS in (8).
Suppose there are two marketplaces at x1 and x2 with −L/2 ≤ x1 <x 2 ≤ L/2.L e t
b x be the market boundary, i.e., the location of the marginal consumer, who is indiﬀerent
toward visiting either of them. Equating the indirect utilities of visiting both marketplaces
yields the market boundary:
b x =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
−L/2 if xint ≤ x1
xint if x1 <x int <x 2
L/2 if xint ≥ x2,
where
xint ≡
y(r − 1) + t(x1r + x2)
t(r +1 )
is the interior market boundary and r ≡ (n1/n2)
1
σ−1.
Is h o wt h a ta g g l o m e r a t e dc o n ﬁguration is a stable equilibrium as follows. If an inﬁn-
itesimal mass of ﬁr m si sl o c a t e da tx2 ∈ ]x1,L/2] while a all remaining mass of ﬁrms is




>L+ x1 >x 2.
Hence, b x = L/2, implying that no consumers visit marketplace 2, and that π2 is necessarily
equal to 0 for any small increase in n2. In other words, the agglomerated conﬁguration
7is always a stable equilibrium. This suggests the lock-in eﬀect in the location of the
marketplace.
In order to upset the agglomerated equilibrium, the nonnegligible number of ﬁrms
should simultaneously move from x1 to x2. This is possible if a coalition is formed among
the ﬁrms, which is however not allowed in the above dynamics with a mass of ﬁrms under
the monopolistically competitive market.2
















This is maximized when the marketplace is located at the center of the line segment
x1 =0 . This is due to the elastic demand for the diﬀerentiated goods.
Stability of the agglomerated equilibrium is guaranteed because ∂π1/∂n1 < 0 and
π2 < 0 hold when they are evaluated at (n1,n 2)=( n∗
1,0). The foregoing argument may
then be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 The agglomerated conﬁguration is always a stable equilibrium irrespective
of its location.
De Fraja and Norman (1993) and Ago (2008) show that the equilibrium location of the
agglomerated marketplace is at the center under suﬃciently low transport costs. However,
it is not necessarily at the center in the case of nonnegligible transport costs.
4 Symmetric equilibrium
Next, consider the case of two marketplaces symmetrically located about the center of
the line segment such that x1+x2 =0 . Making use of symmetry, the equilibrium number
2Note that this is possible under the oligopolistic market with a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms, which can
build coalition as shown in Henkel et al. (2000).




















This is maximized when x2 = L/4, where the sum of the consumer demand is the largest.
Again, this is attributed to the elastic demand for diﬀerentiated goods.
Checking the signs of Jacobian of the RHS of (8), one obtains the stability condition









(σ +1 )L2 − 16(L/2 − x2)
2¤¸
. (9)
Examining (9), one can say that the symmetric equilibrium is stable when goods are close
substitutes (σ large), the transport costs are high (t large), the consumer demand is large
(L large), and the marketplaces are located far apart (x2 large).
When goods are close substitutes, consumers do not care for product variety, and
hence, the agglomeration force is weak. This is in agreement with the result in new
economic geography (Krugman, 1991) as well as that in spatial competition under product
heterogeneity (de Palma et al., 1985).
When the transport costs are high, competition between the marketplaces is softened
because the market boundary is not sensitive to changes in the size of marketplaces (the
integral part in (6)). However, competition within a marketplace does matter (n in
the denominator in (6)). Because the latter eﬀect dominates the former, the symmetric
equilibrium turns out to be stable. As before, this agrees with the result in new economic
geography as well as that in spatial competition.
Finally, when the marketplaces are located at a distance, the demand at the mar-
ket boundary is small due to elastic demand with respect to distance to be covered for
shopping. Because competition between the marketplaces is localized only at the market
boundary in this model, small demand at the market boundary implies weak competition,
which ensures stability of the symmetric equilibrium.3
3Arakawa (2006) shows that this is not necessarily true if consumers can visit both marketplaces.
95 Evolution of spatial structure
Thus far, the consumer demand has been spatially ﬁxed. However, it is of interest to
consider endogenous locations of consumers together with those of marketplaces in a
growing city in the following way. Each consumer resides on a plot of land, the length of
w h i c hi sn o r m a l i z e dt o1 . 4 In order to receive the ﬁxed income y, each consumer has to
commute to the central business district, which is located at x =0a n di sa s s u m e dt ob e
spaceless. Because commuting involves costs, consumers eventually locate on the interval
[−L/2,L/2] in equilibrium, where L is the population size as given by the length of the
line segment.
The population is initially small and is steadily growing exogenously. It is inferred from
( 9 )t h a tc o n ﬁgurations with multiple marketplaces are unlikely to be a stable equilibrium
for suﬃciently small L. This would suggest that the initial equilibrium with a suﬃciently
small city is the agglomerated conﬁguration. Once the agglomeration is formed, it is
necessarily stable from Proposition 1. Although the location of the marketplace can be
anywhere in the city, it is natural to assume that it coincides with the location of the
central business district x =0 , to which all consumers commute.
Such an agglomerated equilibrium continues insofar as condition (3) is met. More
precisely, because the maximum distance between the marketplace and consumer locations
is now L/2, the condition is replaced with
y − tL/2 > 0. (10)
Stated diﬀerently, if the population size L grows and exceeds 2y/t, then condition (10) is
violated. In this case, since some consumers are unable to visit a marketplace with distance
greater than y/t, ﬁrms in this single marketplace no longer can serve all consumers in the
linear city. Consequently, the agglomerated conﬁguration is no more an equilibrium, and
hence, new marketplaces would emerge at both edges of the city, x = ±L/2.T h e ym a yb e
4We assume away the land rent for analytical simplicity.
10called the subcenters or edge cities, whereas the initial marketplace is called the center.
Note that the unit transport cost t consists of the unit shopping trip cost ts and the unit
commuting cost tc, i.e., t = ts + tc unlike the preceding sections.
Consumers living close to the marketplace in the city center would visit it for shopping
as well as working on the way back from commuting. Consumers living in the suburbs may
also do the same at the city center. However, they are more likely to go to a marketplace
at the subcenter near their residence because shopping is often done on weekends and
shopping trips are more elastic than commuting trips with respect to distance costs.
In the sequel, I consider several stages according to the change in the number of










,i ≥ 1. (11)
(i) The ﬁrst stage with L ∈ ]0,L 1]
The spatial structure of the right part of the city is illustrated in Figure 1 (the left
part is its mirror image). The city develops from the center x =0to the right (and left)
gradually as population increases. As the city increases in size, consumers at the city edges
entail more costs of shopping trip and commuting and their net income y − (ts + tc)L/2
reduces and ﬁnally equals zero when L = L1.
Due to the existence of the commuting cost to the center, agglomeration at the center
should be a unique equilibrium conﬁguration in the ﬁrst stage as mentioned above. The














σ−1 [y − (ts + tc)x]. (12)
The number n∗ of varieties in (12) is increasing in L ∈ ]0,L 1],b u tt h ea v e r a g ed i s t a n c e
of x is decreasing in L. It can be readily shown that as the city develops, the welfare
11of all consumers in the city increases for a small L. However, as the city grows further,
their welfare near the center x ≈ 0 still increases, but may decrease near the city edges
x ≈ ±L/2 due to high commuting costs. Therefore, the welfare on average initially
increases, but may or may not decrease when the city increases in size. This is because
the beneﬁt from the product variety may or may not be dominated by the commuting
costs. Because the welfare is not transferable across consumers, I do not go into the
w e l f a r ea n a l y s i sa n ym o r e .
(ii) The second stage with L ∈ ]L1,L 2]
When L exceeds L1, consumers living in the interval of ]L1,L] a r eu n a b l et og ot ot h e
city center for shopping because their net income is negative. However, they can instead
visit one of the two new subcenters that emerge at x = ±L1/2. Since they never visit the
center, ﬁrms located at the center cannot take over the whole demand. Put diﬀerently,
ﬁrms locating at the subcenters always have a positive demand by consumers at ]L1,L].
This implies that e v e ni ft h em a r k e t p l a c e sa tt h es u b c e n t e r sa r ev e r ys m a l l ,t h e ya r ea l w a y s
protected from the large marketplace at the center.
When L is not much larger than L1, all consumers residing in ]−L1/2,L 1/2[go to the
center for shopping and the rest of consumers residing in [−L/2,−L1/2] and [L1/2,L/2]
visit the nearest subcenter. However, as L gets larger, the number of ﬁr m sa tt h es u b -
centers increases, and hence, the market boundaries between the center and subcenters
w o u l dm o v ei n s i d et h ei n t e r v a lo f ] − L1/2,L 1/2[. As a result, although the two subcen-
ters become smaller than the center when L is close to L1, they may become larger when
L approaches L2.
Finally, when L becomes equal to L2, the net income of a consumer located at the
city edges is equal to zero, which leads to the emergence of additional subcenters at
x = ±L2/2.
(iii) The i-th stage with L ∈ ]Li−1,L i]
12The evolutionary process (ii) is repeated for each stage. That is, there are 2i −
1 marketplaces at the center and subcenters in the i-th stage. The interval between








Because the location of each subcenter is deﬁned by the sum of the above intervals, it is
given by (11). Thus, we have obtained the following.
Proposition 2 As the subcenters are farther away from the city center, their intervals
get narrower.
This proposition suggests that the marketplaces are smaller in size depending on the
distance from the center because their hinterlands get smaller. This is consistent with
casual observations that the sizes of marketplaces in commuter towns and exurbs are
small in size as they are far away from the city center. Note however that subcenters
may become larger than the center as demonstrated in the above second stage. This may
correspond to the prosperous shopping malls in the suburbs versus the stagnant central
cities often observed in Japan’s small cities.
In order to gain further insight, I impose an assumption that the commuting cost
tc is suﬃciently low but not zero hereafter. Setting tc =0in (13), it can be easily
veriﬁed that each interval between the neighboring marketplaces is equal. This implies
that each marketplace would be of equal size except for the two edges. Such a diﬀerence
is ascribed to the length of the hinterlands near the city edges. As we saw above, the two
edge marketplaces can be larger or smaller in size than the others. In sum, we have the
following.
Proposition 3 When the commuting cost is suﬃciently small, all the marketplaces are
o ft h es a m es i z ee x c e p tf o rt h et w os u b c e n t e r sn e a rt h ee d g e s .T h et w oe d g em a r k e t p l a c e s
are smaller (resp. larger) if L ∈ ]Li−1,(Li−1 + Li)/2[(resp. L ∈ ](Li−1 + Li)/2,L i]).
13Because the intervals of marketplaces are identical, there is no locational diﬀerence
between the marketplaces but for the two edge marketplaces. This is the ﬁrst state-
ment of the proposition. The second statement implies locational disadvantage and ad-
vantage of the edge marketplaces depending upon the size of the hinterlands. When
L ∈ ]Li−1,(Li−1 + Li)/2[, consumers outside the edge locations x = ±Li−1/2 are rel-
atively few. Because of the locational disadvantage, the size of the edge marketplaces
should be smaller than that of the others. This corresponds to the early development
stages of edge cities. On the other hand, when L ∈ ](Li−1 +Li)/2,L i], consumers outside
the edge locations are relatively many, and therefore the edges have better access, i.e.,
locational advantage. This may correspond to large shopping centers and malls, which
are often observed in the suburbs of large cities. Thus, the expansion of the hinterlands
changes locational disadvantage to locational advantage according to development stages.
6 Two-dimensional extension
Thus far, the analysis has been conﬁned to the one-dimensional space. This is extended
to the two-dimension in this section because the geographical space in the real world is
better approximated by a two-dimensional space, while keeping the assumption that the
commuting cost tc is suﬃciently low but not zero. Rather than involving complicated
and detailed analyses with a two-dimensional space, this section is more or less intuitively
described.
Consider a featureless plane with a city center at (x,y)=( 0 ,0), where consumers are
uniformly distributed around the city center over the two-dimensional disc. The ﬁrst stage
is not very diﬀerent from the one-dimensional case. The equilibrium number of ﬁrms, n∗
1,
is somewhat larger than before. Comparative statics and so on are qualitatively similar.
The agglomerated conﬁguration continues to be a stable equilibrium for all L ∈ ]0,L 1].
When the city size slightly exceeds L1, there emerges a continuum of equilibrium lo-
14cation candidates for edge cities unlike the case of the one-dimensional space. That is,
the location candidates are any locations on the circumference of a circle with radius L1
in the two-dimensional space, whereas they are conﬁned to the two locations x = ±L/2
in the one-dimensional space. Suppose many marketplaces emerge simultaneously on the
circumference of a circle when L = L1. Then, distances between many marketplaces
would be short, which would destroy the conﬁguration. This is inferred from the stabil-
ity condition of the symmetric equilibrium that when marketplaces are located close (x2
l a r g ei n( 9 ) ) ,t h ec o n ﬁguration is unstable. Hence, it is more likely that only a few edge
marketplaces are viable simultaneously when L = L1. Because the smaller number of mar-
ketplaces implies a more stable equilibrium conﬁguration, which is likely to survive in the
long-term evolutionary process, we assume the most stable conﬁguration when L reaches
L1.We therefore assume that the number of edge marketplaces is three when L = L1 since
the minimum number of edge marketplaces that can serve the entire consumers is readily
shown to be three. The edge marketplaces are drawn as three I located symmetrically
around the center in Figure 2.
When L exceeds L1 further, but still slightly, consumers located near the three I’ are
unserved. Therefore, three more edge marketplaces are to be immediately established. In
sum, when L slightly exceeds L1, there are one center at (x,y)=( 0 ,0) and six subcenters
I+I’ equidistantly located around the circumference of a circle with radius L1,t h u sc o n -
stituting a regular hexagon. Since distances between any pair of the seven marketplaces
are no less than L1, each marketplace is always protected, i.e., the hexagonal conﬁguration
is stable due to the similar logic as (ii) in section 5.
As the population of the city keeps growing, consumers are continuously spreading
around the city center with one central marketplace and six edge marketplaces I+I’ while
L ∈ ]L1,
√
3L1].W h e n L slightly exceeds
√
3L1, exactly six location points, as marked
by II in Figure 2, are not served. Their locations are on the circumference of a circle
with radius
√
3L1. Thus, adding the ﬁrst group of six marketplaces I+I’ to the second
15group of six new marketplaces II, there are thirteen marketplaces for L ∈ ]
√
3L1,2L1],
and then there are nineteen marketplaces with an addition of the third group of six new
marketplaces III as illustrated in Figure 2.
Continuing these processes of the emergence of new edge cities, the hexagonal conﬁg-
uration similar to Figure 6 in chapter B of part I of Christaller (1933) or Figure 24 in
chapter 10 of Lösch (1940) can be depicted. Note that it diﬀers from Christaller (1933)
i nt h a tt h eh e x a g o n sa r en o tn e s t e db e c a u s et h e r ei so n l yo n eg o o dh e r e .I ti se x p e c t e d
that Christaller’s hierarchical system of nested hexagons is self-organized by introducing
multiple goods having diﬀerent parameters.5 For example, goods with high transport
costs (ts large) form marketplaces with short intervals, whereas those with low transport
costs (ts small) form marketplaces with long intervals. As a result, large marketplaces
with long intervals would emerge, oﬀering a wide array of goods and small marketplaces
with short intervals oﬀering few goods.
In sum, we arrive at the following conclusion.
Proposition 4 Christaller-Lösch’s hexagonal conﬁguration is self-organized endogenously
and stable.
It should be noted that the conﬁguration is self-organized without any presence of
social planners. Finally, when the commuting cost tc is not negligible, the equilibrium
conﬁguration is expected to be a two-dimensional version of Figure 1. Namely, it would
consist of successive hexagons, but the sizes of hexagons would gradually shrink according
to the distance from the center. This would be also true when the population density is
decreasing in the distance from the center.
5To be more precise, multipurpose shopping is carried out by consumers in order to obtain the nested
hexagonal conﬁguration (Quinzii and Thisse, 1990).
167C o n c l u s i o n
Ih a v ee x t e n d e dt h em o d e lo fH e n k e le ta l .( 2 0 0 0 ) ,w h e r eﬁrms compete not only within
a marketplace, but also between marketplaces in order to uncover the number, size, and
locations of marketplaces that constitute central and edge cities. Empirical evidence in
Japan’s large cities shows that the retail share in the suburban areas has been rising as
compared to that in the central areas in these years. The results in this paper agree with
the evidence. Furthermore, this paper has shown that Christaller-Lösch’s hexagonal con-
ﬁguration self-organizes endogenously in the monopolistically competitive retail market.
Thus, it may be safely concluded that the model in this paper is able to describe the real
world as well as Christaller-Lösch’s ideal world.
In this paper, I have chosen to focus on population increase as an exogenous driving
force of emerging subcenters. The population increase accompanies not only suburban-
ization of residential areas, but also job decentralization. The latter is getting common
in recent U.S. metropolitan areas (Lee, 2007), but is not taken into account in this pa-
per. The land rent is also beyond the scope of this paper although it is of importance in
urban economic theory (Alonso, 1964). The next line of research to be addressed may be
incorporating job decentralization and land rent, although such extensions will not be an
easy task.
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19Table 1:  Employment in retail industry in Tokyo Metropolitan Area
 share  share
year   CBD1   CBD2   TMA  CBD1  CBD2
1960 92577 402616 757557 12.2 53.1
1964 98045 426749 831309 11.8 51.3
1968 113123 478628 1018142 11.1 47.0
1972 113771 478604 1129108 10.1 42.4
1974 113051 490908 1181980 9.6 41.5
1976 114541 500262 1244476 9.2 40.2
1979 118666 518210 1343315 8.8 38.6
1982 125677 547023 1460039 8.6 37.5
1985 116509 517986 1465911 7.9 35.3
1988 119072 545337 1623835 7.3 33.6
1991 123102 548495 1681536 7.3 32.6
1994 123524 555005 1797830 6.9 30.9
1997 116887 538283 1791467 6.5 30.0
1999 122540 590935 2000639 6.1 29.5
2002 125462 588989 1998351 6.3 29.5
2004 125423 581870 1956295 6.4 29.7
2007 126444 562501 1935927 6.5 29.1
  Notes:
  CBD1 consists of four wards of Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato and Shinjuku.
  CBD2 consists of twenty-three wards including CBD1.
  TMA consists of four prefectures of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba and Saitama.Figure 2:    Christaller’s hexagonal configuration with 1 center,   
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